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WORLD BANK STUDY
Jennifer N. Weidner*
I. INTRODUCTION
The World Bank (hereinafter, "Bank") is not without its critics.
Commenced as an intergovernmental financial institution with the purpose
of aiding development in economically needy nations, the Bank has evolved
over the past five decades to become an influential force over both eco-
nomic and social policies of the nations that receive Bank aid.' However,
critics are divided on the issue of exactly how involved the Bank should be
in the economic and social policies of its borrower nations. Some critics
advocate increased interaction between the Bank and various non-govern-
mental organizations in order to bolster the education of the Bank regarding
various economic and social injustices that occur within the boundaries of
borrower nations. Some others propose that the Bank limit its role as policy
watchdog. These critics of economic and social intervention predict that
the Bank will fail to maintain credibility as a financial institution when it
exerts influence over its borrower nations' economic and social policies, or,
to be more specific, when it allows judgments about borrower nation poli-
cies to influence Bank lending practices.
The Bank is not an organization that acts autonomously from its
members. It operates as a form of a democracy, and its member nations are
represented (though not equally) in the Board of Executive Directors.
Member nations vote on projects and issues. Their votes, however, do not
weigh in equally. Each member nation may vote in accordance with its
membership investment in the Bank, which means that the member nations
with the largest investments in the Bank will carry the loudest voices. At
first blush, it may seem that the system of member influence, supported by
the voting structure, is equitable. We may think that a nation that pays the
most for a right of influence will invariably be the nation that values the
right most. We may be tempted to conclude that the nation who fails to pay
consideration for such a right has performed an analysis of the cost of the
right with the benefits the right confers, and has determined not to purchase
it. The right of influence, therefore, has been fairly auctioned off. What
should give us pause is that all nations and their currencies are not finan-
* Juris Doctor candidate Dec. 2001. The author wishes to thank Professor
Athena Mutua for her guidance and support.
1 The Bank exerts policy influence by conditioning funding to a developing na-
tion upon the nation's implementation of Bank-specified policy changes. See infra
note 10.
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cially competitive. A struggling member nation will not be able to purchase
a right of influence when its dollar is weak and it has few of them. We
must not conclude that the struggling member nation is disinterested in ob-
taining a right of greater influence than it has. Nor can we conclude that the
struggling member nation concurs with the international policy goals of the
more influential members. What may be a vociferous "nay" vote from a
member with little capital to contribute to the Bank may sound like a mur-
mur of protest when dwarfed by the resonance of influential member votes
to affirm.
A Bank motto for the year 2000 is "Our dream is a world free of
poverty." '2 This tenet is consistent with the Bank's original purpose at the
time it was founded. 3 As this note will discuss, however, the Bank has
since expanded its scope of attention to include the reform of various egre-
gious environmental and social policies. 4 Care must be taken as the Bank
expands its role to influence implementation of changes in the policies of its
borrower nations. The risk is that the economic and social policies endorsed
by the Bank's largest shareholders will, by nature of the Bank's voting
structure, largely influence the position taken by the Bank on borrower na-
tion reform. Borrower nations may be compelled to accept the conditions
imposed by the Bank so that they may receive much-needed financial assis-
tance, when in fact the conditions encouraged by the Bank (channeled from
the majority shareholders) are ill-fitted to serve for the borrower nations'
economic and social cultures. If they are not universal, economic and social
ideals cannot broadly be beneficially imposed upon all nations.
The United States is the largest Bank shareholder, with 14.96% of
the total votes in the Bank.5 Japan is the second largest shareholder with
10.73%, Germany is the third largest with 7.03%, and France is fourth with
4.26%.6 Seven other nations hold between 2 and 4 percent of the voting
rights for a total of 19.31% between them, and 149 nations hold the remain-
ing 43.71%.7 A great majority of the latter group of nations holds less than
one-third of one percent of the Bank's voting rights.8 This note explores the
influence that can be (and often is) exerted by the United States as the
Bank's primary shareholder. Its purpose is not to criticize the reforms en-
2 See, for example, THE WORLD BANK, 1999 ANN. REP. (1999), back cover.
3 See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
4 Id.
5 THE WORLD BANK, 1999 ANN. REP. 317 (1999), Statement of Voting power,
and Subscriptions and Contributions as of June 30, 1999.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
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couraged by the United States in the United States' exercise of influence.
The note is to articulate the problems created when any primary shareholder
is in a position to pressure developing nations to implement the primary
shareholder's domestic ideals, through an inter-governmental vehicle that is
purportedly disinterested in enforcing such ideals.
We as citizens of the United States boast of the checks and balances
inherent in our democratic system. One of the most crucial branches in our
government is the judicial, whose purpose is to serve as a check against the
power of the majority vote. It is this particular check that protects the mi-
nority against injustice stemming from majority rule. This note will explore
whether there are adequate checks to influence that may be exerted by the
Bank's primary shareholder, that is, whether an adequate actor exists on
behalf of the minority members of the Bank to check the influence of the
majority. The note shall conclude that currently there is no adequate force
to counteract the power of the majority under the current Bank allocation of
voting rights. Finally, the note will consider changes to the voting structure
with an eye toward greater representational equity.
A comprehension of the Bank's intended purpose and its operating
structure is first necessary in order to critically analyze the Bank's primary
shareholder's influence and the Bank's representation of members. There-
fore, this note will provide an overview of the Bank's structure and mission
before addressing substantive concerns of member influence over the
Bank's policies and practices which in turn affect the policies of borrower
nations.
II. STRUCTURAL OVERVIEW
The Bank is comprised of five agencies. The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD"), established in 1945, provides
loans to middle income nations and poorer nations whose credit is deemed
adequate. The loans, which represent approximately 75% of the Bank's
annual lending,9 are funded primarily by the IBRD's sale of AAA-rated
bonds to institutional and private investors in international markets.' 0 The
IBRD has earned a positive net income every year for the last 51 years,
9 IBRD loans are made to borrower nations whose average annual per capita
income exceeds $895 U.S. dollars, sometimes in conjunction with IDA interest-free
loans. <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/about/wheremoney.htm>. When a
borrower's average annual per capita income approaches $5,500, the borrower
starts to "graduate" from IBRD lending. (visited Nov. 1999) <http:!
www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/about/eligibility.htm>.
1o World Bank Group Institutions (visited Nov. 1999) <http://www.worldbank.org/
html/extdr/about/wbgis.htm>.
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though it is not designed as a profit-maximizing organization."I The Inter-
national Development Association ("IDA"), established in 1960, provides
interest-free loans (termed "credits") to nations who qualify based on per
capita income.12 The loans are made only to the governments of the bor-
rower nations. 13 The borrower nations pay a fee of less than 1% to cover
administrative costs. These loans, which represent the remaining 25% of
Bank lending, are funded primarily by the contributions donated from both
industrial and developing member nations 4. The International Finance
Corporation ("IFC"), established in 1956, provides technical assistance and
advice to governments and businesses, and supports developing nations'
business ventures with loans and equity financing. This financial support is
provided by the IFC in conjunction with private venture capital investors. 15
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA"), established in
1988, both assists in developing nations' promotion of business investment
opportunities and provides guarantees to foreign nations who invest in a
developing nation's business venture against loss, if the loss is caused by
"non-commercial risks".1 6 The MIGA is funded by member capital. 17 The
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), es-
tablished in 1966, operates to arbitrate investment disputes that arise be-
tween the investor nations and the "investee" nations.' 8 Of the 66 cases
registered with the ICSID, 11 were registered in the Bank's 1999 fiscal
year, which indicates a recent rise in international investment disputes. 19
11 THE WORLD BANK, 1999 ANN. REP. Xii (1999).
12 To meet borrowing eligibility requirements, a potential borrower nation's per
capita income must not exceed $1,506 U.S. dollars per year. However, the reality
is that nations who receive IDA loans have average annual per capita incomes of
less than $895. Those with per capita incomes that exceed that amount generally
receive a mix of IBRD and IDA interest-free loans. See Eligibility for Borrowing,
supra note 9.
13 THE WORLD BANK, 1999 ANN. REP. xiii (1999).
14 See World Bank Group Institutions (visited Nov. 1999) <http://www.world
bank.org/html/extdr/about/wbgis.htm>.
15 See id.
16 Id.
17 THE WORLD BANK, 1999 ANN. REP. xiii (1999).
18 See World Bank Group Institutions, supra note 14.
19 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 17, at xiii.
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Though these five agencies are separate from one another, one indi-
vidual serves as President for all five institutions.20 The President tradition-
ally is a citizen of the Bank's largest shareholder member, which, from the
Bank's inception, is and has been the United States. The position is elected
by member nations in accordance with their purchased voting rights for a
renewable term of five years.2 1
The Bank is owned by its member nations, each purchasing shares
of the Bank as a requisite for membership. As discussed in the introduc-
tion, member nations have voting power correlative to their percentage of
Bank ownership. Each member appoints a Governor and an Alternate Gov-
ernor to represent the nation at the Bank's Annual Meeting.22 The Annual
Meetings cover issues such as, inter alia, decisions pertaining to admission
or suspension of members, distributions of net income, capital stock autho-
rizations, and review and endorsement of financial statements and budg-
ets.23 The Annual Meetings are not intended to handle all of the Governors'
responsibilities; rather, the Governors delegate many of their duties to the
Board of Executive Directors ("Board"). The Bank's web site explains the
role of the Board as follows:
Every member government of the World Bank Group is
represented at the Bank's headquarters in Washington, D.C.
by an Executive Director. The five largest shareholders -
France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the
United States - each appoint an Executive Director, while
the other member countries are represented by 19 Execu-
tive Directors who are elected by groups of countries (or
constituencies). Some countries - China, Russia, and
Saudi Arabia - have formed single-country constituencies,
while others have joined together in multi-country constitu-
encies. The 24 Executive Directors normally meet twice a
week to oversee the Bank's business, including approving
loans and guarantees, new policies, the administrative
20 See About the World Bank Group (visited Nov. 1999) <http://www.worldbank.
org/html/extdr/about/>. Currently, James D. Wolfensohn serves as Bank president.
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 17, at 3.
21 See The World Bank Group (visited Nov. 1999) http://www.worldbank.org/
html/extdr/about/whoruns.htm>.
22 See id.
23 See id.
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budget, country assistance strategies, and borrowing and fi-
nancial decisions.24
Board representation, therefore, is not allocated equally among member na-
tions, but is allocated in accordance with the amount of money member
nations have invested in the Bank.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF BANK OBJECTIVES
The Bank was established in 1944 as a product of the United Na-
tions Monetary and Financial Conference in a response to the financial dev-
astation in Europe resulting from World War 11.25 Accordingly, the Bank's
Articles of Agreement articulates one of its primary purposes as the assis-
tance in
the reconstruction and development of territories of mem-
bers by facilitating the investment of capital for productive
purposes, including the restoration of economies destroyed
or disrupted by war, the reconversion of productive facili-
ties to peacetime needs and the encouragement of the de-
velopment of productive facilities and resources in less
developed countries.26
However, since other measures were implemented to attend to Eu-
rope's financial troubles, the Bank shifted its focus from the economic
needs of Europe to the economic needs of developing nations.27 The IBRD
and IDA take the position that their mandate restricts them to activities
pertaining solely to economic issues arising from the promotion of member
nations' development. Indeed, the agencies' Articles of Agreement limit
the factors the agencies can take into consideration when reviewing the ac-
tivities of members and potential members; they "explicitly require the
Bank to base its decisions only on economic consultations and to not take
political factors into account in its decisions. '28 Though the Articles of the
24 See id.
25 See Halim Moris, The World Bank and Human Rights: Indispensable Partner-
ship or Mismatched Alliance?, 4 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 173, 178 (1997).
26 Id. (excerpting from Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, opened for signature, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440,
T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, as amended Dec. 16, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 1942,
T.I.A.S. No. 5929).
27 See id.
28 Daniel D. Bradlow, The World Bank, The IMF, and Human Rights, 6 TRANS-
NAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 52 n.24 (1996).
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IBRD and IDA refer to the concepts of "economic considerations" and "po-
litical affairs", neither term is defined, leaving "both institutions to interpret
for themselves. ..to determine what issues and activities fall within their
permissible scope of operations. ' 29 Likewise, the Bank's interpretation of
the term "development" was, until the 1960's, that of economic growth.
This notion was to evolve in response to "the failure of economic growth to
adequately address the problems of the poor"; thus, the Bank "began broad-
ening its understanding of which activities were included within the scope
of its mandate by focusing more directly on poverty alleviation and basic
human needs."30 From the 1960's until now, the Bank has added "policy-
based lending, environmental concerns ... , gender issues ... , governance,
economic transformation and private sector development to its repertoire of
appropriate operations. ' 3'
An example of policy-based lending is the Bank's funding of finan-
cial sector adjustment loans which originally were intended to effect reform
in the borrower nation's financial sector. The purpose of the policy-based
loans has been extended over time to include, inter alia:
Reform of the civil service; reform of the management of
public sector enterprises; legal and judicial reform; family
planning; improving the quality of education and the equity
of access to primary education; reform of universities...;
land titling and registration reform; programs to ensure that
vulnerable groups such as women, children, indigenous
people, and other minorities get access to health, education,
and other Bank funded programs.3 2
Lending objectives for the Bank's 1999 fiscal year further illustrate the
Bank's role as social governor. These objectives include, inter alia:
... [to flocus AIDS prevention especially on poor, high-risk
groups, [e]radicate malaria, [p]romote health systems re-
form to address needs of poor, [p]ursue solutions for child
labor, [e]liminate malnutrition,. . Improve access to credit,
especially for poor women,. .. [r]eintegrate ex-soldier into
home communities, provide assistance to veterans. ..33
29 Id. at 55.
30 Id. at 56.
31 See id.
32 Id. at 57-58.
13 THE WORLD BANK, 1999 ANN. REP. 9 (1999).
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The Bank's involvement in activities not clearly and directly related to eco-
nomic development can be explained by the close connection between what
may be considered an economic factor and what may be considered a politi-
cal factor. Even issues that seem clearly to be issues of social policy can be
analyzed by its economic impact. 34
A criticism of the Bank's attempt to justify lending decisions by
distinguishing actions motivated by economic issues from actions moti-
vated by political factors is that economic policies may be just as unique to
different cultures as are human rights.35 The Bank may just as easily disre-
gard the sovereignty of its member nations when it bases its decisions on
what it believes to be beneficial for a member nation's economy as it might
if it were to base them on issues concerning political factors. Differences in
economic structures utilized by member nations may lead to disparate re-
sults when the Bank applies a universal notion of economics to them in the
Bank's decision making process.36
IV. LENDING IN EXCHANGE FOR PROMISES
The Bank's lending during the first three decades of operation was
primarily in the form of funds that were to be applied to a specific project in
the borrower nation.37 However, in an effort to avoid the failure of projects
in borrower nations, due to the borrower's poor macroeconomic policy, the
Bank developed a "second type of loan". 38 This new loan structure did not
specifically allocate the funds to a particular project but could be applied as
the borrower nation deemed appropriate, in exchange for the borrower na-
34 Professor Daniel Bradlow refers to the following example to prove this point:
"The ambiguity in the Bank's interpretation of its mandate can be seen in its deci-
sion that female genital mutilation is an economic issue. The Bank has justified
this decision by pointing to the economic costs associated with female genital muti-
lation." Bradlow, supra note 28, at 61. Professor Bradlow points to the Bank's
contrasting interpretation of "economic issue" as it has been applied to freedom of
the press: "[T]he Bank has not been willing to treat freedom of the press as an
economic issue, despite the obvious economic costs associated with the lack of a
free press." Id.
35 Issues of universality of human rights law and policy are discussed infra p. 26.
36 Moreover, the blurry distinction between economic and political factors as
noted by Professor Bradlow may indicate that economic ideals and social ideals
may be closely enough connected so as to justify the conclusion that they aren't
separate sector considerations at all, but are, instead, too intertwined to separate.
37 Kim Reisman, Note, The World Bank and the IMF: At the Forefront of World
Transformation, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 353 (Ann. Survey Issue 1992).
38 Id.
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tion's promise to reform its economic policy.3 9 There are two types of pol-
icy-based loans. Structural adjustment loans attach "policy-based
conditions aimed at forcing the borrowing countries to conform to certain
Bank policies and practices in their internal and/or external affairs". 40 Sec-
tor adjustment loans "support economic reform within a particular sector,
such as trade liberalization, financial deregulation, or agricultural price re-
form". 4' For the first time ever, the Bank's 1999 fiscal year saw adjustment
lending exceed its investment lending; the Bank attributes this departure
from historical lending ratios to its support of a "wide range of reforms
found vital in the aftermath of crisis. '42 It would appear from the 1999
lending ratios that the primary lending perspective of the Bank has evolved
from an investment perspective to that of influencing national policies of
borrower nations through adjustment lending.
Both criticisms and praise of the Bank's attempts at influencing va-
rious types of reforms through adjustment lending are well-documented.
For example, in a 1997 article analyzing the Bank's involvement in human
rights issues, Halim Moris illustrates that opponents of the Bank's interven-
tion in the human rights policies of borrower nations believe that since only
developing nations are in a position to seek and receive financial assistance
from the Bank, the result is necessarily that only developing nations are
subject to the Bank's imposition of human rights policies.43 According to
the opponents of Bank intervention, the intervention violates the interna-
tional principle of sovereign equality.44 Further, the opponents argue that
the Bank's intervention in issues, such as human rights, violates the Bank's
Articles of Agreement and the United Nation's prohibition of international
coercion, and that the practice is detrimental, in that, withholding assistance
to nations who have documented human rights violations only serves to
perpetuate those human rights violations.4 Additional arguments against
Bank intervention are that the Bank risks losing its credibility as a financial
institution when it focuses on human rights policy issues and that the Bank
39 See id.
40 Moris, supra note 25, at 181.
4 1 Reisman, supra note 37, at 353 n. 37.
42 THE WORLD BANK, 1999 ANN. REP. iii (1999). "Crisis" refers to the recent
financial crisis primarily experienced by Southeast Asia. "East Asia and Latin
America together accounted for $10.2 billion" of the $15.3 billion outstanding ad-
justment lending. Id.
43 See Moris, supra note 25, at 185-86.
44 See id.
41 See id. at 182-192.
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lacks the expertise to effectively gauge and monitor human rights abuses. 46
Moreover, as Halim Moris points out, opponents believe that the Bank is
inconsistent in its application of its adjustment lending philosophy because
the Bank "has a 'history' of funding projects that involve human rights
abuses". 47 For example, "despite the atrocious human rights' abuses in
China .. .the World Bank and the United States have nevertheless posi-
tioned China as the highest aid recipient country, due to the potential eco-
nomic benefits to be had once the large Chinese market is infiltrated". 48
Moreover, the opponents to Bank intervention argue that the Bank intrudes
upon borrower nations' rights to economic development when it withholds
aid.49
Advocates of the Bank's intervention in human rights issues argue
that the Bank's Articles empower it to consider human rights issues in its
lending policies, and that because the Bank is a specialized agency of the
United Nations, the Bank is "obligated to cooperate with the United Nations
in the area of human rights".50 Further, advocates who conclude that the
Bank is legally required to consider human rights issues when conducting
Bank business point to the principle of erga omnes in support of their con-
clusion. 51 The principle of erga omnes provides that "a state which violates
peremptory human rights norms is accountable to all other states, and thus
cannot claim that its human rights policies are within its exclusive domestic
jurisdiction. '52 Proponents of Bank intervention argue that the Bank's abil-
ity to condition funds on human rights reforms is not economic coercion
per se, but is rather an act of "pressure", and that the "International Court of
Justice explicitly affurmed that the suspension of economic aid is not an
illegal act that breaches international law". 53 Finally, advocates debunk the
notion that conditional assistance violates a nation's right to development
by countering that the right to development is a right that rests within
human beings, rather than states, and that states have enjoyed development
while individual residents of the state have not (breaking the perceived cor-
relation between development of the state and development of persons). 54
46 See id.
47 Id. at 190.
48 Id. at 189.
49 See id. at 186-87.
50 Id. at 193.
51 See id. at 195.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 See id.
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V. THE UNITED STATES' INFLUENCE OVER WORLD BANK POLICY
AND REFORM
Recall that the primary problem with a large shareholder's exertion
of influence over Bank policy is that the Bank, in turn, exerts influence over
policy reform in its borrower nations. The influence, channeled from a ma-
jor Bank shareholder, flows through the Bank and is exported to the nation
that seeks financial assistance from the Bank. As not all policies regarding
social order, human rights, environment, and the like are universal, the re-
sult can be a policy unfit for the borrower nation who is compelled to ac-
cept the order of policy change. The borrower nation that disagrees with
the conditions, yet accepts the conditional funding, is unlikely to have its
problems with the conditions heard among the din of large shareholder
voices.
Ian Bowles and Cyril Kormos describe in their 1995 article the role
of the United States Congress in pressuring the Bank to take a more active
role in establishing reform of borrower nations' policies, specifically with
regard to environmental concerns stemming from Bank-funded develop-
mental projects. 55 They trace influence exerted by the United States Gov-
ernment as the United States became aware of the three most effective
methods of exerting influence over the Bank and other organizations: do-
mestic policy guidance for the United States Government officials repre-
senting the nation in international organizations, imposition of voting
restrictions on Bank matters for United States officials serving as Executive
Directors for the Bank 56, and the use of conditional funding. 57 With respect
to conditioning funding for the Bank on the Bank's implementation of vari-
ous policies and procedures, Bowles and Kormos explain that "Congress is
free to determine the amount of funding it provides for any given program,
to set conditions for disbursements or even to earmark part of its contribu-
tion. ' 58 Therefore, under United States legal standards, the United States is
free to exercise influence over international organizations by exerting finan-
55 See Ian A. Bowles and Cyril F. Kormos, Environmental Reform at the World
Bank: The Role of the U.S. Congress, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 777 (1995).
56 An example of voting restrictions is the 1989 Pelosi Amendment, contained in
the International Development and Finance Act enacted by the United States Con-
gress, effective 12/19/91. The Pelosi amendment prohibited "U.S. executive direc-
tors of [multilateral development banks] from voting in favor of any proposed
action unless an [environmental impact assessment] has been conducted at least
120 days before the loan comes before the board of directors for a vote." Id. at
795.
51 See id. at 781.
58 Id. at 782.
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cial pressure, since the United States determines funding for international
organizations at free will.
Bowles and Kormos indicate, however, that the legal validity of
conditional appropriations is less certain in the international context.5 9
They acknowledge that the Bank's "Articles of Agreement ... do not per-
mit political considerations to play a role in loan approval; instead, decision
making is based solely on economic factors. In fact, the World Bank is not
legally permitted to accept any funds appropriated conditionally by a partic-
ular country. ' 60 In spite of this legal restriction, Bowles and Kormos state
that the Bank "continues to be sensitive to the concerns of the legislature of
its biggest donor. '61 The apparent departure from the Bank's legal standards
when the Bank is forced to consider financial pressure by a member nation
that is in a position to exert such pressure may be explained by nuances in
interpretation of the Articles of Agreement as described earlier in this arti-
cle. For example, although Article 4, Section 10 of the Bank's Articles of
Agreement state that the Bank should not be influenced by the political
character of its members, 62 Bowles and Kormos theorize that
section 10 does not state that the Bank shall not be influ-
enced by the political 'activities' of its members, a phrase
which could reasonably be intended to refer to legislative
pressure or lobbying. Instead, section 10 speaks of political
"character." Though the word "character" is ambiguous, it
strongly suggests that what the Articles of Agreement are
primarily concerned with are ideological considerations. 63
Bowles and Kormos conclude that the Congressional initiatives to influence
Bank policies are imposed on the United States officials who serve as exec-
utive directors to the bank, rather than on the Bank itself; therefore, the
59 See id.
60 Id. at 808.
61 Id.
62 See Articles of Agreement, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, art.
IV, § 10, cl. 2, amended by 16 U.S.T. 1942, T.I.A.S. No. 5929 (Dec. 16, 1965).
63 Bowles and Kormos, supra note 55, at 810. This logic is an interpretive manip-
ulation. Inserting our own definition of undefined terms in the Articles of Agree-
ment would allow us to draw whatever conclusion we desire from the Articles'
intent and purpose. Yet the inference drawn by Bowles and Kormos demonstrates
the flexibility in determining what the Articles' restrictions on accepting member
influence really mean.
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"legislation does not constitute interference into the internal political affairs
of a member country." 64
Opponents of United States' Congressional influence over Bank
policies have argued that the effects of the influence undermine the Bank's
multilateral character. 65 Bowles and Kormos concede that when one mem-
ber nation exerts influence by internal legislation, its action is unilateral
with respect to other countries, and that if all member countries exerted
similar influence, "the result could paralyze the World Bank. '66 However,
Bowles and Kormos intimate that there are other member countries that
support the United States' purposes in exerting influence, though they may
not announce their support publicly. 67 Moreover, Bowles and Kormos
postulate,
it is unclear that legislation constitutes unilateral action...
Simply because Congress passes legislation giving the U.S.
executive director instructions, or establishing conditions
for U.S. contributions, it does not follow that Congress
works directly with the World Bank... Congressional leg-
islation does not necessarily affect the multilateral charac-
ter of the Bank; even though the World bank has made
efforts to respond to congressional criticisms, it is certainly
at liberty to ignore the legislation completely. 68
Any offeree of conditional funding, in any context, is technically free to
reject the conditions attached to the funding. It necessarily follows that the
funding would be denied if the conditions are not agreed to by the potential
recipient. It is not clear, however, that past Bank decisions, to be "sensi-
tive" to the concerns of its biggest donor, were made free of external pres-
sures. Rather, it may only be assumed that the Bank has been "sensitive,"
as such, because the Bank has weighed costs and benefits of its acquies-
cence and determined that such "sensitivity" was in the best interests of the
Bank.
Bowles and Kormos predict that the Bank "will continue to object
to congressional intrusions but is unlikely to take radical steps to resist ag-
gressively what has become the status quo. ' 69 If it were true that the Bank
is unlikely to actively resist the United States' interference in Bank policies,
64 Id. at 812.
65 See id.
66 Id.
67 See id.
68 Id. at 813.
69 Id. at 822.
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it would not be due merely to the disinclination to disturb a historical pat-
tern of succumbing to such influence. Disturbing the status quo is, in es-
sence, exactly what the Bank was designed to do, via the provision of
funding for development projects in borrower nations. It is also exactly
what the Bank has taken upon itself to do, by the issuance of loans to bor-
rower nations that are conditioned upon the borrower nations' implementa-
tion of policy changes within their governments. It is perhaps ironic that
the Bank would object to the same type of economic coercion enforced by
its largest donor, when that is exactly the method it uses to influence reform
in borrower nations. However, the difference lies in the character of the
parties; when the Bank conditions funds on reform in borrower nations, the
voting members act multilaterally with respect to deciding appropriate Bank
actions. When the United States conditions its donations on specific reform
within the Bank, it acts unilaterally with respect to the reform it desires. If
we could be certain that the reform ideals imposed by the United States
transcended cultural differences, we could assume that although the United
States acts unilaterally, it has the support of the majority of the Bank mem-
ber nations. However, the most we could assume is the weak assumption
voiced by Bowles and Kormos that "other donors can respond ... by pres-
suring the United States to refrain from such unilateral actions" '70, and, since
we have not heard much opposition, conclude that there are no objections.
It is more realistic to conclude that if the Bank does not aggressively fight
unwanted influence, it is because the Bank does not believe the fight to be
worth the cost, which would be the loss of the largest donor country's favor,
and possibly lead to the loss of the largest donor country's funding.
In a more recent article, Ian Bowles and Cyril Kormos herald Con-
gress' participation in international financial institutions as a "sound invest-
ment", as institutions such as the Bank "provide a forum in which close
international cooperation and a financial multiplier effect allow U.S. poli-
cies and interests to resonate effectively."'7' They explain that participation
in the Bank "also allow[s] the United States to pursue its foreign policy
more discreetly than it could if it were acting alone in the international
arena. '72 Bowles and Kormos track the influence imposed by the United
States Congress over Bank policies with respect to environmental concerns.
One example cited by Bowles and Kormos of the United States' influence
over Bank accountability and formal restructuring is Senator Robert Kas-
ten's correspondence to the Bank president "criticizing the serious environ-
70 Id
71 Ian A. Bowles & Cyril F. Kormos, The American Campaign for Environmental
Reforms at the World Bank, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 211, 212 (1999).
72 Id.
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mental impacts of the Polonoroeste project in Brazil". 73 Bowles and
Koormos conclude that Senator Kasten's letter effectively persuaded the
next Bank president to create an independent Environmental Department
within the bank as well as "Regional Environmental Divisions. . . within
each Vice Presidency" that would result in increased environmental staff.74
Bowles and Kormos explain the causal connection between Senator Kas-
ten's correspondence and the resulting reform as follows:
Because Senator Kasten served as chairman of the Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee, which oversaw U.S. contri-
butions to the World Bank, his action to ask President Con-
able to respond to environmentalists' concerns raised the
stakes in terms of World Bank accountability to Congress. 75
Further United States influence over Bank policy occurred in 1993,
when the influence led toward the creation of the Bank's Inspection Panel.
Congress perceived a need for the Bank to increase its accountability to the
public and recommended the establishment of a "permanent independent
commission for investigating public concerns about Bank-financed
projects. '76 Senator Leahy, in correspondence to Bank President Lewis
Preston outlining the recommendation, referred to "the waning tolerance for
an institution supported with public funds that denies the public access to
relevant information . . .77 This recommendation coincided with Congres-
sional authorizations for the United States' contribution to IDA replenish-
ment.78 When Bank Managing Director Ernest Stern verbally informed
Congressman Barney Frank that he doubted that the Bank could feasibly
create the recommended inspection panel with the time left before the end
of the year, Congressman Frank "reportedly replied that in that case, he did
not think Congress had time to authorize [the United States' contribution to
IDA replenishment]. '79
While it is true that the examples cited by Bowles and Kormos of
Congressional exertion of influence over Bank policy resulted in policy re-
forms deemed beneficial from a Western perspective, it is also true that
these efforts can be fairly termed as "strong-arming". Bowles and Kormos
73 Id. at 214-15.
74 Id. at 215.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 219 (quoting correspondence from Senator Leahy to Bank President
Lewis Preston of June 1993).
77 Id.
78 See id. at 219-20.
79 Id. at 220.
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conclude that because Congress' largest successes in inducing the Bank to
alter its policies have resulted from conditioning funding on specific policy
changes, the United States has learned that "conditioning appropriations on
specific structural changes is the most effective form of legislation."80 Lest
one conclude that such tactics carry a danger of abuse and should therefore
be condemned, Bowles and Kormos justify conditional funding as the only
way to encourage the Bank to implement policy reforms. "[G]iven the re-
sistance to progress and the massive inertia at the Bank, it is questionable
whether anything short of dire threats could have induced change." 8'
Moreover,
Congress' response to criticism of its expanded role [of in-
volvement in international affairs] has been to argue that
the power of the purse is explicit and plenary under the
Constitution. Efforts to reform the World Bank, therefore,
do not constitute establishing foreign policies, but are
rather a simple exercise of oversight over the way [United
States] taxpayer money is spent ... Congress may be en-
tirely justified in taking such a course of action, because the
President's power in foreign affairs may not be quite as far
reaching, or at least not as exclusive, as previously
believed.82
Bowles and Kormos accede to the existence of the argument that "actions
have made [the Bank] hostage to the directives of one country's legislature
in clear violation of the institution's multilateral and apolitical nature", but
dismiss that argument as frivolous. 83 They assert in rebuttal that the "U.S.
government is at liberty to determine on what terms it makes financing
available to the World Bank .... In turn, the World Bank has the right to
reject conditional funds or ignore policy recommendations that Congress
makes. '84 Bowles and Kormos conclude that international institutions are
relatively weak "in arguing against the decision-making processes of mem-
ber countries", yet seem to infer that the Bank's acquiescence thus far has
been voluntary.85
The question arises whether the Bank is indeed free to reject condi-
tional funding. What would happen, for example, if the United States, the
80 Id.
81 Id. at 222.
82 Id. at 222-23.
83 Id. at 223.
84 Id.
85 Id.
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biggest shareholder, threatened to withdraw participation because the Bank
refused to accept terms upon which the United States conditioned its partic-
ipation? A primary shareholder clearly has influence over the Bank due to
its allocation of voting privileges which are based on share ownership. A
primary shareholder can also exert increased influence by threatening to
withdraw its interest. The increased influence is exponentially correlative
to the degree to which the primary shareholder's interest exceeds the other
shareholder interests.
Consider the following analogy. If Country A has eight pennies,
and Country B has two, both countries can vote in accordance with the
pennies they own. Both countries can both threaten to withdraw their pen-
nies. However, the effects of Country A withdrawing its pennies is far
greater than the withdrawal of Country B's pennies, not just because Coun-
try A has more pennies, but because Country A's pennies have an added
value of greater control than Country B's pennies. A block of shares owned
by one party is worth more than the same number of shares owned by dis-
parate parties, and the value discrepancy increases with the amount of con-
trol associated with the block of shares. The more shares a member nation
has, the more those shares are worth.
Similarly, the question arises whether the United States' 14.95%
voting rights really puts the United States in a position to exert an undue
amount of influence. Professor David A. Wirth argues that the notion of
undue influence by the primary shareholder is unsupported. "It is far from
clear that a single State ... with less than one-fifth of the voting power in
the World Bank - could be said to be exercising prohibited unilateral pres-
sure in a multilateral setting. . .Even the five largest donors to the Bank
acting in concert could not by themselves assure that a particular loan pro-
posal would be disapproved. 86 The five largest donors together hold a total
of 40.52%.87 Application of simple mathematics would have us agree;
40.52% is not a majority. However, the five largest donors, with their col-
lective 40.52%, plus their collective increased share value due to the large
blocks of shares they own, may very well be enough to exert influence over
the percentage of other voting shares they might need to effect a particular
voting result. It is important to remember that member nations also relate
to one another outside the realm of the Bank, and that the largest sharehold-
ers tend to be globally influential in other contexts. It is not clear that the
largest shareholders would be prohibited from acting in concert outside the
86 David A. Wirth, The United States and the World Bank: Constructive Reformer
or Fly in the Functional Ointment?, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 687, 701 (1994) (book
review).
87 THE WORLD BANK, 1999 ANN. REP. 317 (1999).
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context of the Bank to elicit a response from other Bank member nations
within the Bank context. Furthermore, it is not evident that the five largest
shareholders, for example, would be precluded by the Bank from increasing
their investment in the Bank to collectively obtain a majority position. Act-
ing in concert, Professor Wirth argues, "would arguably qualify as a legally
significant pattern of behavior." '88 There is no evidence at this point, how-
ever, what Bank response would be, if any, to such collusion on behalf of
the largest shareholders, especially if the collusive action were performed
with the approval of the largest voting members of the Bank. Based on the
increased influence inherent in the major Bank shareholders, it might be
anticipated that a threat by the United States as a primary shareholder to
withdraw funding could elicit some type of compromise on behalf of the
Bank. Consequently, the enhanced value of the largest blocks of shares
calls for special review of the largest shareholders' motives, especially in
light of threats to withdraw funds unless certain conditions are met.
An instance of United States' withdrawal of Bank support occurred
in 1993, when the United States conditioned $30 million earmarked for the
Global Environment Facility (a three-year program established by the Bank
in conjunction with the United Nations Environment Program and the
United Nations Development Program to protect the environment) on the
Bank's "implementation of procedures allowing public access to GEF pro-
ject information. '89 Since the Bank failed to meet the deadline set for the
specific reforms, the funds were diverted to another program, the AID. 90
Congress, however, may not be as prompt to remove funding altogether; in
response to a strong call by environmentalists to completely eliminate mul-
tilateral development bank funding, the House of Representatives issued a
report that stated that "cutting off assistance would only lead to further eco-
nomic decline and increased poverty further aggravating environmental
damage." 9' However, if the United States' commitment to improving envi-
ronmental conditions through borrower nations' development projects were
so strong as to outweigh the option of cutting funding for the projects,
threats to withdraw funding would carry no real bite.
If all Bank member nations espoused the same set of economic and
social ideals, the danger posed by one nation's enhanced influence over
Bank activity and policy would be lessened. However, differences in moral
judgments and accepted human rights lead to a problem inherent with the
presence of a dominant member nation. Simply put, the United States is in
88 Wirth, supra note 86 at 701.
89 Bowles and Kormos, supra note 55, at 801.
90 See id.
91 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 125, at 39, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)).
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the position to impose notions it believes to be morally and fundamentally
correct upon nations that do not subscribe to the same views, but who may
be compelled to accept conditional funding because of economic need.
This is especially true of member nations who have considerably less voting
power than the United States. If the member nation with whom the United
States disagreed in terms of human rights had significant voting power in
light of the United States' voting influence, it could more effectively
counteract the votes of the United States in proposing certain conditions in
connection with funding.
If a borrower nation were offered funding that was conditioned on
conforming its domestic policies to those of the dominant member nations,
the borrower nation could react in one of three ways. The borrower could
accept the imposition of policy changes, in which case the dominant nation
would be self-congratulatory, with the impression that the "correct" out-
come was achieved and their notion of human rights would prevail. It
should be noted, however, that nations that do not share the dominant na-
tion's policy perspective could view the borrower nation's acceptance of
the conditions as a sell-out to a set of morally incorrect ideals. Alterna-
tively, the borrower nation could accept the terms of the funding and either
pay sheer lip service to the conditions without actually making substantive
changes, or ignore implementation of the conditions altogether. In so do-
ing, the borrower nation risks the revocation of funding, though in reality
this may not be a likely event.92
Policy ideals are not absolutely universal; if they were, all nations
would subscribe to substantially similar positions, which would largely
eliminate international policy conflict regarding policy ideals. In the con-
text of human rights, for example, some scholars argue that if we are to
believe that human rights law is legitimate, then there must exist valid no-
tions of justice that transcend cultural divides. 93 If this is true, then it is less
of a problem when a dominant nation seeks to impose its notions of human
rights - assuming, that is, that the dominant nation's notions are universally
"correct". Others argue the flip side; if notions of justice are relative to
92 For example, consider China, the Bank's largest recipient of funds. See THE
WORLD BANK, 1999 ANN. REP. 272 (1999), Summary Statement of Loans. In spite
of long term United States opposition to what the United States concludes are
human rights abuses persisted by China, China continues to receive Bank benefits.
This may be partly explained, however, by the fact that China is the 6th largest
Bank shareholder. See id. at 275 (Statement of Subscriptions to Capital Stock and
Voting Power).
93 See Guyora Binder, Comment: Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism
in Human Rights Law, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211 (1999).
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different cultures and are not universal, then human rights law has no legiti-
macy. 94 Professor Guyora Binder suggests that for human rights law to be
valid in light of cultural relativism, our evaluation of human rights law must
evolve from the historical perspective of European nation-states to recog-
nize the representative notions of geographically and culturally diverse na-
tions and states.95 Professor Binder suggests that analyzing contemporary
human rights issues using "traditional" notions of human rights law im-
poses a restricted set of imperialistic ideals; the problem is not the imposi-
tion of imperialism, but the fact that the imperialism imposed has not
evolved beyond the ideals embraced by its Western founders.9 6 Professor
Binder concludes that "[u]nless human rights norms become part of the
global process of governance by which the neocolonial state is constituted
they can have little impact for good or ill".97 If we accept Professor
Binder's conclusion and translate it to issues surrounding Bank influence,
we must recognize the importance of ensuring that all member states are
able to contribute meaningful input regarding the Bank's activities.98 The
ability to contribute meaningfully may not be achieved solely through share
allocation voting.
VI. POTENTIAL CHECKS TO BANK INFLUENCE OVER BORROWER NATIONS
There are several institutions inside and outside the Bank structure
that could potentially serve as checks to the Bank's ability to exert influ-
ence over the economic and social policies of borrower nations. The insti-
tutions could, if effective, serve to check the primary shareholder from
effectively imposing its own policy ideals onto borrower nations. These
include the Bank's own Inspection Panel, non-governmental organizations,
and to some degree, the Bank's new Comprehensive Development Frame-
work.99 Each institution has strengths that give it potential to help ward
94 See id.
95 See id.
96 See id.
97 Id. at 221.
98 Note, however, that all members have veto power if the Bank funds an activity
they disagree with - that is, if the activity is located within its region.
99 Although the International Court of Justice exists, and an International Criminal
Court has been proposed, these institutions are not good candidates to serve as
checks against undue influence exerted by intergovernmental organizations over
nations that choose, freely or out of financial need, to become members or debtors
of the intergovernmental organizations. The role of the International Court of Jus-
tice ("ICJ") is to settle legal disputes submitted to it by states. Groups of people or
individuals do not have standing before the ICJ and must therefore convince their
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against unwanted policy imposition and weaknesses that impede its ability
to do so.
A. The World Bank Inspection Panel
The Bank's Board reviews and approves loan applications from po-
tential borrower nations based on information provided by Bank staff.' °° In
preparing recommendations to the Board, Bank staff can exercise a great
deal of discretion:
[S]taff members determine which loan requests develop
into negotiable loan proposals. In addition, by deciding
who to consult and how much weight to attach to the infor-
mation available to them, the staff influences both the is-
sues and the range of opinions that are incorporated into the
loan appraisal reports presented to the Directors. In es-
sence, the Bank's staff influences the form and substance of
the information that Board members ultimately receive
about each loan proposal. The staff can also influence the
Executive Directors' decisions on loan proposals through
the timing of their loan presentations to the Board.' 0'
Historically, the Board had no established channels through which it could
supplement staff-provided information with facts and information from par-
states to bring an action if one is warranted. For information on the function, com-
position, jurisdiction and procedure of the ICJ, see the ICJ web site at <http://
www.icj-cij.org> (visited site Apr. 13, 2000). For a discussion of limitations of
access to the ICJ, see Thomas Hutchins, Using the International Court of Justice to
Check Human Rights Abuses in World Bank Projects, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L.
REV. 487 (1992). Though the statute proposing the International Criminal Court
("ICC") has been adopted, at least 60 nations have to ratify the statute before it is
considered effective and the ICC can be established. As of February 16, 2000, 7
states had ratified the statute. Moreover, the ICC would have jurisdiction over
criminal allegations against individual parties, rather than states, for the crimes
such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and perhaps war crimes and aggression,
to establish an international rule of law. In all probability, the ICC will deem Bank
member disputes stemming from Bank exertion of influence outside its intended
jurisdiction. For information on the proposed ICC, visit the web site for the Interna-
tional Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development at <http://
www.ichrdd.ca/11l/english/commdoc/publications/romeStat.html> (visited site
Apr. 7, 2000).
"0 Daniel D. Bradlow, International Organizations and Private Complaints: The
Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 553, 561 (1994).
101 Id.
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ties that would be affected by the transaction. 02 Consequently, the Board
"was reduced to acting as little more than a rubber stamp of staff deci-
sions."10 3 With no adequate check in place to counteract the enormous level
of control wielded by the staff, Bank staff was operating with inadequate
accountability to the Board. Individuals adversely affected by the loan
transaction were unable to bring action against the Bank, unless they could
convince their government to bring an action as a member or borrower na-
tion.' °4 As a result, the Bank was operating without meaningful accounta-
bility to parties who were directly affected by the loan transaction.
A 1984 development project in India, for which the Bank loaned
funds, elicited international opposition. 105 In response to the opposition, the
Bank appointed an independent commission to report upon the Bank's in-
volvement in the project. 0 6 The commission concluded that the Bank had
egregiously violated its policies and procedures with regard to the loan pro-
cess. It "found the quality of the technical and environmental studies com-
pleted for this project to be so inadequate that it could not make
recommendations on how to correct problems with the project." 107 The
conclusion that the Bank's failure to comply with its stated procedures led
to violations of property rights, among other things, along with a report that
found that Bank-supported projects were not performing well, resulted in
the Bank's creation of the Inspection Panel in September 1993 by formal
resolution (hereinafter, "Resolution'). 10 8 The World Bank Inspection
Panel's self-defined motive is "to provide an independent forum to private
citizens who believe that their rights or interests have been or could be
directly harmed by a project financed by the Bank." °9 The Panel, which is
comprised of three members appointed by the Board, functions indepen-
dently of the Bank staff and reports directly to the Board.' 10 In his 1994
review of the Resolution creating the Panel, Professor Bradlow explains the
legal significance of the Panel's creation: "[i]t is the first forum in which
private actors can hold an international organization directly accountable
for the consequences of its failure to follow its own rules and proce-
102 See id. at 561,
103 Id.
104 See id. at 562.
105 See id. at 563.
106 See id.
107 Id. at 563-64
108 See id.
109 World Bank Group Inspection Panel Web Site (visited Mar. 7, 2000) <http://
www.worldbank.org/html/ins-panel/index.html>.
110 Bradlow, supra note 100, at 553.
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dures."'I Professor Bradlow heralds the creation of the Panel as "the first
formal acknowledgment that international organizations have a legally sig-
nificant non-contractual relationship with private parties that is independent
of either the organization's or the private actor's relationship with a mem-
ber state."'' 12
In spite of his optimistic characterization of the Panel, Professor
Bradlow outlines possible concerns with the ability of the Panel to serve its
stated purpose. For example, the Panel can only review a complaint that
has to do solely with Bank activity. If a private party's complaint involves
the conduct of his or her government as well as the actions of the Bank, the
Panel lacks jurisdiction to review the complaint. 113 The complainant's only
recourse is to take up the issue with the borrower government or another
international group, if it can." 14
Professor Bradlow indicates that the 1993 Resolution creating the
Panel fails to address an additional number of important communication
issues. He states that the "Resolution fails to explicitly establish the com-
plainant's right to receive and respond to communications between the
Panel and other interested parties, particularly Bank staff." 15 Therefore,
once the complainant has issued a complaint, the complainant is not neces-
sarily privy to statements made in response by the Bank to the Panel, and
vice versa. The complainant's confidence in the impartiality of the process
is impaired by a lack of assurance that the process is free of biased commu-
nication to which the complainant does not have the chance to rebut. Pro-
fessor Bradlow indicates that due process concerns mandate that both the
Bank and the complainant "should be given an opportunity to respond to
each other's arguments." 116 He further argues by not establishing commu-
nication rights, the Bank fails to "make every effort to understand the argu-
ments and concerns of those opposed to its actions," in opposition to the
Bank's goal of promoting "transparent and accountable governance to its
member countries." 117 Without the guarantee of open communication, the
Panel's complaint process lacks the transparency and accountability which
it attempts to ensure on behalf of the Bank. In addition, Professor Bradlow
'" Id. at 554.
112 Id.
"1 See id. at 577-78.
11 See id. at 578.
115 Id. at 584-85.
116 Id. at 585. Due process is, of course, a fundamental Western ideal and may not
correspond equally to other cultures. However, as the Bank is constructed as a
quasi-democracy, it seems appropriate that the notion of due process be considered.
117 Id.
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states, there are "too many opportunities for ex parte communications be-
tween the Panel and the Bank's staff, the borrower, and the Executive Di-
rector representing the borrower state", which can lead to impaired
confidence in the fairness of the complaint review process as a whole."18
The Board has the discretion to accept or reject the Panel's recom-
mendation regarding whether an investigation of the complaint is war-
ranted. Another potential problem stems from the Resolution's mandate
that the Board's decision to accept or reject the Panel's recommendation
must be made public in a published report." 9 The published report must
also include the complaint and the Panel's recommendation, but leaves
open the possibility that the Bank "could decide to publish edited summa-
ries of the Panel's proceedings," rather than the full, unedited text of the
documents. 120 Professor Bradlow suggests that if the public suspects that
the published report is an edited format, questions would arise regarding
what possibly pertinent information was edited out of the public report. 121
Such questions would diminish the credibility of the published report and
impede the goal of transparency and accountability.
Current criticisms of the Panel's adequacy as a check to the Bank's
activities in projects that may adversely affect groups or individuals are
voiced, among others, by the activist group "50 Years is Enough" (hereinaf-
ter, "50 Years"). One of 50 Years' arguments is that the Panel is an ineffi-
cient guard against project arrangements between the Bank and the
borrower nation that result in harm caused to residents of project nations.22
50 Years argues that Bank "[m]anagement has continually tried to circum-
vent the Panel process by developing secret 'action plans' with the Bor-
rower country whenever a claim is filed. By the time the Panel is ready to
seek authority from the Board to investigate a claim, management and Bor-
rower can oppose the investigation on the grounds that the action plan is
sufficient."' 123 50 Years appears to assume that management opposition is
influential on the Board's decision to grant or deny authority for the investi-
gation. This assumption may be somewhat cynical; the 1999 Clarifications
to the Resolution states that management "will not communicate with the
118 Id. at 591.
119 See id. at 593.
120 Id.
121 See id.
122 See 50 Years is Enough, The World Bank's Inspection Panel: Background and
an Update, ECONOMIC JUSTICE NEWS, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Sept. 1999), which may be
found at the 50 Years is Enough web site address of <http://www.50years.org/ejn/
v2n3/panel.html> (visited Mar. 7, 2000).
123 Id.
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Board on matters associated with the request for inspection, except as pro-
vided for in the Resolution. It will thus direct its response to the request...
to the Panel. Management will report to the Board any recommendations it
may have, after the Panel completes its inspection and submits its findings
"124
However, the concern expressed by 50 Years regarding action plans
is valid, if they are indeed entered into in lieu of Panel investigations. Ac-
tion plans are addressed by the Resolution, which defines them as agree-
ments between the borrower and the Bank that "seek to improve project
implementation." 125 Action plans, states the 1999 Clarifications to the Res-
olution, are
[o]utside the purview of the Resolution, its 1996 clarifica-
tions, and these clarifications. In the event of agreement by
the Bank and borrower on an action plan for the project,
Management will communicate to the Panel the nature and
outcomes of consultations with affected parties on the ac-
tion plan. Such an action plan, if warranted, will normally
be considered by the Board in conjunction with the Man-
agement's report [which addresses Bank failure and possi-
ble Bank remedial efforts, in response to a complaint]. 26
The 1999 Clarification to the Resolution indicates that an action plan is
largely immune from Panel review. The "Panel may submit to the Execu-
tive Directors for their consideration a report on their view of the adequacy
of consultations with affected parties in the preparation of the action plans.
The Board should not ask the Panel for its view on other aspects of the
action plans nor would it ask the Panel to monitor implementation of the
action plans."'' 27 Therefore, the Panel has only the authority to opine
whether the action plan adequately consulted affected parties. The 1996
Clarification to the Resolution states that "no procurement action is subject
124 THE WORLD BANK, Conclusions of the Board's Second Review of the Inspec-
tion Panel (visited Mar. 7, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/ipwg/
secondreview.htm> Approved Recommendation No. 2 (Apr. 1999).
125 THE WORLD BANK, Conclusions of the Board's Second Review of the Inspec-
tion Panel (visited Mar. 7, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/ipwg/
secondreview.htm> Approved Recommendation No. 15 (Apr. 1999).
126 Id.
127 THE WORLD BANK, Conclusions of the Board's Second Review of the Inspec-
tion Panel (visited Mar. 7, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/ipwg/
secondreview.htm> Approved Recommendation No. 16 (Apr. 1999) (emphasis
added).
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to inspection by the Panel, whether taken by the Bank or by a borrower."'
128
If the Panel believed the action plan to be inadequate in substance, it would
be powerless to object. The clarifications do not indicate that in the consul-
tations with the affected parties, the affected parties must agree to the action
plan as a remedial action in lieu of a Panel investigation. The 1996 Clarifi-
cation refers to a "separate mechanism [that] is available for addressing
procurement-related complaints", but does not identify the mechanism. 129
The 1996 and 1999 Clarifications to the Resolution do endeavor to
clear up some deficiencies in the Resolution. 130 One interesting 1999 clari-
fication is regarding the Board's authorization of an investigation recom-
mended by the Panel. The resolution reads: "If the Panel so recommends,
the Board will authorize an investigation without making a judgment on the
merits of the claimants' request, and without discussion except with respect
to the following technical eligibility criteria... ". 131 On its face, this would
appear to reduce the Board's discretion in rejecting a Panel recommenda-
tion of an investigation to issues purely relating to the standing and eligibil-
ity of the complaint and the complainant. It remains to be seen whether this
128 THE WORLD BANK, Review of the Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel,
Clarification of Certain Aspects of the Resolution (Oct. 1996) (visited Mar. 7,
2000) <http.//www.worldbank.org/html/ins-panel/IPNclarification.html>.
129 Id.
130 For example, Professor Bradlow points out that the Resolution fails to "stipu-
late what information a complainant should include in a successful request for an
inspection." Bradlow, supra note 100, at 585. The World Bank Inspection Panel's
web site currently has a link to "The Inspection Process", which gives a suggested
format for a Request for Inspection. See <http://www.worldbank.org/html/ins-
panel/index.html> (visited Mar. 7, 2000). Another deficiency in the Resolution,
raised by Professor Bradlow, is that while the Resolution allows any "'affected
party' except a single individual to bring a complaint" to the Panel, the "Resolution
does not define 'affected party."' Bradlow, supra note 100, at 583. The 1996 Clar-
ifications to the Resolution provide a definition for "affected party"; it is "a com-
munity of persons such as an organization, association, society or other grouping of
individuals ... [that] includes any two or more persons who share some common
interests or concerns." The "Review of the Resolutions Establishing the Inspection
Panel, Clarification of Certain Aspects of the Resolution" may be found on the
World Bank Inspection Panel's web site at <http://www.worldbank.org/html/ins-
panel/IPNclarification.html>. (visited site Mar. 7, 2000). The clarification of "af-
fected persons", however, may not specifically address Professor Bradlow's ques-
tion of whether a juridical person has standing to bring a complaint.
131 THE WORLD BANK, Conclusions of the Board's Second Review of the Inspec-
tion Panel (visited Mar. 7, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/ipwg/sec-
ondreview.htm>. Approved Recommendation No. 9 (Apr. 1999).
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clarification will affect the Board's discretion in practice, specifically when
an action plan has been submitted by the Bank and borrower nation to the
Board for its consideration.
The Clarifications to the Resolution are an encouraging sign that
the Board perceives the Resolution as a flexible-enough instrument to an-
swer to challenges with which it is presented. The Panel may still be seen
in its infancy; it has been in existence for one-tenth of the time that the
Bank has been in operation. We may anticipate that the role of the Panel
will continue to evolve over time and with experience. At the very least,
the Panel's effort to provide accountability of the Bank to individuals of
project-borrower nations for Bank decisions regarding project funding
should serve to some degree as a check to influence exerted over the Bank
by larger Bank shareholders. The Bank may be less likely to succumb to
shareholder pressure on issues the Bank largely disagrees with if there is an
adequate accountability mechanism to the project-borrower nation re-
sidents. The efficiency of the accountability mechanism, however, may be
dampened by the alternative use of action plans between the Bank and a
complainant's government.
B. Non-governmental Organizations
Non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") are not-for-profit enti-
ties "whose members are citizens or associations of citizens of one or more
countries and whose activities are determined by the collective will of its
members in response to the needs of the members of one or more communi-
ties with which the NGO cooperates."'' 32 Operationally, NGOs can serve as
guardians over issues they hold significant, and can provide makers and
enforcers of law and policy with information that might not otherwise be
readily available to them, in the hopes that the information will influence
the makers and enforcers in support of the NGOs' causes. NGOs are
"emerging as agents of change, in part because they have conceptualized
problems and solutions without regard to national boundaries.., they have
made substantial contributions already . . . to the drafting of international
agreements, norm creation, and implementation of agreements."'' 33
NGOs have no formalized legal status with regard to inter-govern-
mental organizations ("IGOs") or governments, and therefore the IGOs and
governments are free to adopt a position they deem appropriate regarding
132 Wendy Schoener, Non-Governmental Organizations and Global Activism: Le-
gal and Informal Approaches, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 537, 538 (1997)
(quoting from the Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/AC.70/1994/5
(1994)).
133 Id. at 539.
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their relationship to NGOs. In spite of an absence of a legal obligation to
work with NGO's, large inter-governmental organizations such as the Bank
and the United Nations have accepted the establishment of working rela-
tionships with various NGOs. Scholar Wendy Schoener has studied the re-
lationship between the United Nations and various NGOs, and finds that
NGOs are "widely recognized by U.N. committees and programs as vital to
U.N. work." 134 Schoener attributes the United Nations' perception of
NGOs' value to the "NGOs' freely offered assistance, which has made them
virtually indispensible to the U.N. In particular, their 'expertise, diplomatic
skills, good relationships and contacts, and a clear vision about objectives'
have proven useful" to the United Nations. 13 5
In the last decade, the Bank has increased its use of NGO assistance
in its development projects. 28% of its projects in the period 1987 to 1996
involved the participation of NGOs in some fashion; that percentage has
increased to 52% in the Bank's 1999 fiscal year. 36 The Bank states that
Involvement is sought at all phases of the Bank's work -
planning and design of projects, implementation, and im-
pact evaluation - because participation improves the qual-
ity, effectiveness, and sustainability of development
activities. NGOs and other civil society groups play an in-
creasingly critical role in ensuring that Bank-supported
projects are participatory in nature, through both their own
involvement and their ability to reach out to other stake-
holders - especially poor and excluded communities.1 37
In an effort to maximize the assistance offered by NGOs, the Bank has
developed a team to monitor interaction between the Bank and NGOs. Spe-
cifically, the purpose of the team is to identify "examples of best practice,
[strengthen] Bank-NGO collaboration, coordinat[e] approaches to collabo-
ration in policy dialogue and operations, and improv[e] knowledge of
NGOs and civil society by sharing and disseminating experience." 138 The
team works in cooperation with the Bank's NGO Working Group, which, as
part of the NGO-World Bank Committee meets twice a year with Bank
management with the goal of strengthening Bank-NGO cooperation. 139 Ac-
cording to the Bank, the Bank provides funding for NGOs in developing
134 Id. at 550.
135 Id. at 550 (quoting Van Boven, supra note 64, at 224).
136 THE WORLD BANK, 1999 ANN. REP. 139 (1999), Table 3-5.
137 See id.
138 Id. at 140.
139 See id.
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nations through the Bank's Small Grants Program. 140 Though this is most
certainly one way for the Bank to demonstrate its support of NGO exis-
tence, the funding connection between the Bank and the Bank-funded NGO
impedes NGO independence from the Bank. NGO independence from the
governments and IGOs to which they report is important to the NGOs' abil-
ity to freely opine about the information they provide.
It is important to keep in mind that, in spite of the Bank's encour-
agement of NGO participation, not all NGOs can be heard by governments
and intergovernmental organizations such as the Bank and the United Na-
tions. There are simply too many NGOs and too little time and too few
resources at the IGOs' meetings to attend to each and every NGO platform.
As a result, an IGO may select a certain number of NGO participants to
work with the IGO. Selected NGOs are given consultative status by the
IGO. Even with consultative status, there is no guarantee that the NGO
platform will be seriously considered by the IGO; for example, conferences
may see the NGOs booked for presentation late at night, after most targeted
delegates have left for the day.14 1
In understanding the relationship between IGOs, such as the Bank,
and NGOs, it is crucial to realize that some of the very nations whose citi-
zens experience the most egregious human rights violations do not have
adequate socio-political systems to encourage or even permit the existence
of NGOs in the first place. For example, the People's Republic of China
"has deemed independent human rights reporting to constitute counterrevo-
lutionary propagandizing and disclosure of important state secrets," which
is a violation of Chinese law.' 42 Another example is Singapore, which
criminalizes the existence of independent human rights advocacy groups.143
Moreover, even if NGOs that support social rights were permitted in every
nation, cultural differences may stand in the way of the type of reform
NGOs are designed to encourage. Henry Steiner explains this concept:
Western-derived norms stressing individual rights stem
from a historical experience and from social formations that
are alien to the Third World... For the First World, the
140 See id. at 141.
141 For example, at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, "with so
many governments and NGOs wanting to speak ... NGOs are frequently allotted
the least popular time, late at night, when there are few government delegates to
hear or respond to them." Michael H. Posner & Candy Whittome, The Status of
Human Rights NGOs, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 269, 286 (1994).
142 Id. at 277.
143 Id.
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assumption may well be valid that rights of speech, associa-
tion and participation will bring about a vibrant and more
democratic process. . . Those same protections would not
have the same effects in many Third World countries where
fundamental violations of rights can coexist with apparent
freedoms of speech. 144
Therefore, although individual rights are the basis for many Western socie-
ties, First World nations may not accept notions of the rights of the individ-
ual; the notions may be too foreign to their culture to allow for beneficial
application.
Even in a highly developed nation that embraces NGO participa-
tion, NGOs may temper their opinions in order to appear more palatable to
IGOs or the NGOs' government, because the NGO desires IGO and govern-
ment favor. If an NGO espouses radical points of view, they may be alto-
gether rejected by the individuals and groups upon whom the NGO depends
for advocacy. For example, in the past, several environmental NGOs sup-
ported cutting appropriations to force environmental change at the Bank
and voiced their opinion to a United States Congressional Representative.
That representative responded with a mandate to his staff to cease working
with certain NGOs. 145 Similarly, NGOs may be tempted to forgo taking a
global civil society perspective on human rights for a domestic perspective,
for the domestic perspective is more appealing to the NGOs' governments,
when the global view may have helped them better meet their goals. 146 As
Henry Steiner explains, "Employing domestic standards rather than interna-
tional law might be politically expedient - more political clout, less risk
that an NGO will be viewed as inspired by alien doctrine. On the other
hand, international law has strategic advantages in countries whose domes-
tic legal norms are of little assistance."1 47
In spite of cultural barriers, continued and enhanced NGO partici-
pation in IGO and government dealings with matters affecting individual
rights can serve to benefit both the IGOs and governments as well as the
intended human rights beneficiaries. The level of success that will be
achieved by NGOs in this regard is dependent partly upon curing what ails
144 HENRY STEINER, DIVERSE PARTNERS: NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT 24 (1991).
145 See Bowles & Kormos, supra note 55, at 836.
146 The phrase "global civil society" refers to the "effect of nonstate organizations
on State and international actions ... The term springs from the older notion of
"civil society". Schoener, supra note 132, at 552.
147 Steiner, supra note 144, at 5.
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the NGO/IGO-government collaboration, which seems to be steeped in cul-
tural differences. It may be that bridging cultural differences, rather than
attempting to homogenize cultural notions of rights, will bolster the effec-
tiveness of NGO involvement with IGOs.148 It will also depend on the level
of IGO and governments' acceptance and respect of NGO participation.
The steps the Bank has taken to encourage NGO involvement is encourag-
ing in this regard, and if the Bank's recent actions are a wave of the future,
human rights NGOs will accomplish much toward their goal of educating
law and policy makers and enforcers.
C. The Bank's Comprehensive Development Framework
In its 1999 Annual Report, the Bank describes its recent implemen-
tation of the Comprehensive Development Framework ("CDF") within its
practices. 149 Although it appears that the CDF attempts to bolster borrower
nation participation in development projects, exactly what the CDF is and
how it operates are difficult to describe. Bank President James D. Wolfen-
sohn terms the CDF a "vision", a "formulation", and an "agenda".150 More-
over, it is hard to pin down a definition of the CDF because it takes
different approaches with different borrower nations. For example, the
CDF was piloted in the West Bank and Gaza by implementation of work-
shops and seminars on subjects such as water, municipal finance and legal
reform. 15 1 In Romania, the CDF resulted in a "series of in-country consul-
tations inviting a wide range of stakeholders to help the country articulate
its own development strategy." 152 What seems clear from the 1999 Annual
Report's descriptions of the CDF is that the CDF is an effort to establish
joint communications and activities between the Bank and the member gov-
ernments to effectuate developmental reform. As the 1999 Annual Report
states, the CDF
suggests a holistic approach to development that recognizes
the importance of macroeconomic fundamentals but gives
equal weight to the institutional, structural, and social un-
derpinnings of a robust market economy. It emphasizes
strong partnerships, donors, civil society, the private sector,
148 The notion of bridging cultural differences is, of course, too large and compli-
cated a topic to fully explore within the confines of this note and is outside the
scope of this note.
149 THE WORLD BANK, 1999 ANN. REP. 26 (1999).
150 Id. at xiv.
151 See id. at 7.
1.2 Id. at 6.
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and other development actors. Perhaps most important, the
country is in the driver's seat, both "owning" and directing
the development agenda, with the Bank and the country's
other partners each defining their support in their respective
business plans ... the whole framework rests on the pre-
mise that the Bank need not lead - or even be involved - as
long as the process produces the desired results. 153
The 1999 Annual report describes key CDF principles as "long-term vision,
holistic approach, and ownership including civil society participation.' 1 54 It
appears that the "desired results" referred to in the 1999 Annual Report
vary from country to country.
The CDF appears to be intended to encourage various reforms in
developing nations by way of borrower participation in voluntary reform
programs. Whether or not the CDF serves as a check to pressure exerted by
the Bank upon borrower nations to accept policy changes depends on what
borrower participation really means in practice. It also depends on whether
the participation is truly voluntary. It may be that the participation is
equally voluntary to a borrower nation's acceptance of specific conditions
attached to project funding, which, as this note has discussed, the borrower
nation may be financially pressured to accept. If, however, the borrower
nation really is in the "driver's seat"'155 in the CDF programs, the CDF may
allow the borrower nation some latitude in determining its own develop-
mental reform.
Since the CDF program has just finished its pilot year, it is prema-
ture to attempt to gauge the program's success, especially since it may be
also premature to grasp a concrete definition of the program thus far. How-
ever, both the Bank's assessment of CDF and the pilot nations' opinions of
the benefits of the program will be of interest as we attempt to evaluate
whether the CDF contributes to borrower and member nation representation
and involvement in the Bank's functions.
VII. CONCLUSION
The root of the capability of the primary Bank shareholder to exert
pressure over Bank policy, which in turn allows the primary shareholder to
impose policy reform it deems beneficial upon a borrower nation, is the
Bank's weighted voting structure. It is a natural result for large sharehold-
ers to be able to exploit their influence over Bank policy when the weight of
153 Id. at 4.
154 Id. at 6.
155 Id. at 4.
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their vote is correlative to the amount they have invested in the Bank.
There are institutions that have some potential to check the amount and
character of influence one shareholder may exert over Bank policy, such as
the Bank's Inspection Panel and non-governmental organizations. How-
ever, each institution discussed is flawed either by structure or by interpre-
tation and is not able to completely counteract or prohibit the potential for
exploitation of the influence carried by large Bank shareholders. If there is
a solution to the problem of shareholder influence over the Bank, which
should be neutral in its regard of the domestic policies of its borrower na-
tions, it lies in revision of the Bank's voting structure and the treatment of
conditional funding by shareholders.
One possible revision of the voting structure would be to eliminate
the correlation between the weight of a member's vote and the amount of
Bank shares held. Each member would carry one vote, ensuring that each
member's vote was equally reflected in Bank voting activities. The benefit
is that the Bank voting structure would be less susceptible to purse-power
influence. The drawback is that the inability to purchase influence through
investment may discourage wealthy shareholders from their current level of
investment. The incentive for wealthy countries to aid developing nations
through a neutral organization such as the Bank diminish in comparison to
donating funds directly to the beneficiary nation, in which case, the donor
countries are largely free to attach specific conditions on their funding.
Another conceivable revision is to explicitly prohibit Bank mem-
bers from utilizing threats to withdraw Bank funding if the Bank fails to
meet certain conditions. The Bank is prohibited by its Articles of Agree-
ment from accepting any funds from a particular donor which are contin-
gent upon the donor's conditions being met.15 6 However, this prohibition
does not answer for the same situation, reverse-engineered by the donor, in
which a donor threatened to revoke funding if certain conditions are not
met. This specific prohibition would help to diminish the ability of mem-
bers to leverage their influential position with the Bank. However, as in the
elimination of the weighted voting structure, the problem with this sugges-
tion lies in the fact that Bank membership is voluntary. A wealthy nation
may decide not to invest on the same scale if they are precluded from exer-
cising the influence they anticipated they would receive in return for their
investment. In addition, there is a possibility that the Bank, either due to
financial dependence on, or political deference to the primary shareholder,
would continue to attempt to work out compromises in the face of such a
prohibition, just as the Bank has done in the face of the prohibition of ac-
cepting conditional funding.
156 Bowles & Kormos, supra note 55, at 808.
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A more realistic suggestion may be the implementation of a special
review process when an influential member nation pressures policy change
over the Bank. A key component of a special review process would be an
enhancement of minority member nation voting power. This could take the
form of a special vote on action to be taken when a shareholder clearly
wishes to effect Bank policy change and attempts to do so on the basis of its
investment in the Bank. In such a special vote, each nation should carry
only one vote, which is a deviation from the normal weighted voting struc-
ture. Again, a potential drawback to this suggestion is that if the influential
shareholder's conditions are voted down, there is decreased incentive for
that nation to fund the Bank.
Bowles and Kormos have indicated that "confining or prescriptive
legislation regarding the World Bank may irritate... the World Bank and
other donors .. . other donors can respond, however, by pressuring the
United States to refrain from such unilateral actions."'' 57 Inferable from this
statement is that an absence at large of pressure from other donors to refrain
from conditional funding may mean that the other donors either do not find
the influence exerted by the United States on the Bank to be intolerable, or
do not believe the policies pushed by the United States are based in error.
However, if an influential shareholder is really interested in reform that is
accepted as beneficial on a global basis, the vote against a specific condi-
tion could serve as a signal that the proposed reform is not universally-
accepted. If it is not, the proponent of the reform should consider the ef-
fects of the reform in cultural contexts outside its own.
157 id. at 822.
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